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Israel or the hijackers of “9/11.” However,
he argues further that if Freud is correct,
the balance to Thanatos is Eros, or the
love of life. While Thanatos drives humans to self-annihilation, Eros drives
them to embrace each other with affection and support. The Freudian view is
that both concepts are real and in eternal
struggle; there can never be a lasting
peace between them.

an aerospace company for over forty
years and never missed a day to sickness. Every night, after work, he drank
himself insensate. That is my most salient memory of him. Now, after my
war, I know that his drinking was a
learned coping behavior that served
him well after each landing. It also got
him through the rest of his life. Such is
war’s effect.

Hedges closes with a plea: “To survive
as a human being is possible only
through love. And when Thanatos is ascendant, the instinct must be to reach
out to those we love, to see them all in
their divinity, pity and pathos of the
human.” Love alone, for the author, has
the ability to overcome human destructiveness. One feels almost compelled to
regurgitate the Beatles line, “All you
need is love.” Therein lies the serious
weakness of this book. Hedges is convincing in his analysis and reflection on
war but superficial to the point of triviality about its necessary counterbalance, love. It is as if he remains
addicted to the very thing that he recognizes will destroy him.

With this book Hedges has rammed the
issue of morality and ethics of war in our
faces. Will we take heed, or simply strike?

Nevertheless, every civilian defense executive, soldier, sailor, Marine, and airman should read War Is a Force That
Gives Us Meaning. Those of us who
have known the intimate jag of war also
know its nightmares. Hedges’s work is a
cautionary tale implying that nations
and peoples should enter war most reluctantly. It warns that war should be a
last resort, and that tragic consequences
may result even so.
My father made four opposed landings
with MacArthur’s army in the Southwest Pacific theater, each one with the
first assault wave. He was never
wounded. After the war, he worked for
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Henriksen, Thomas H., ed. Foreign Policy for
America in the Twenty-first Century: Alternative
Perspectives. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution
Press, 2001. 152pp. $15

A brief, clean-cutting compendium
with six well known scholarly contributors, Henriksen’s volume illuminates
the current cardinal directions in the
debate over American foreign policy—
unilateral versus multilateral interventionism along one axis, and aggressive
promotion of democracy (or global
markets) versus conservative harboring
of national strength on the other. Behind this compass hides the more theoretical discussion of whether the United
States needs or could possibly maintain
a grand strategy in the absence of an
immediate national security threat.
Henriksen’s own contribution (introduction and chapter 5) is to lay out the
dynamics of the post–Cold War world,
emphasizing the rise of China, threats
from rogue states, a stumbling Russia,
and a series of regional crises that
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mandate “measured global activism” in
order to protect U.S. national interests.
John Lewis Gaddis stresses the need to
develop a coherent U.S. grand strategy
in the post–Cold War world—primarily
as a tool for managing foreign policy in
a disciplined, proactive fashion rather
than simply responding to crises on a
case-by-case basis. Gaddis argues, “A
country without a strategy is like a missile without a guidance system. It’s
likely to dissipate resources ineffectually
and spread potential damage far. It can
pose as many risks to those who build
and maintain it as it does to those at
whom it’s supposed to be aimed.”
Gaddis is known as a key historian of
the Cold War. Under current circumstances, he sees grand strategy as an
“endangered discipline,” suffering from
a shortage of generalists who understand the “ecology” of the international
environment rather than narrow regional or functional specialties.
Starting the directional debate, Richard
A. Falk argues that American grand
strategy should emphasize strengthening global economic governance via international financial institutions,
support for European Union–type regionalism as a means of international
security, and the transformation of the
United Nations toward a global parliament. In Falk’s view, all these developments are in sync with the natural
instinct of America, although thus far
“the United States’ position has exemplified the democratic paradox of favoring democracy at the domestic level but
resisting its application at the global
level.” Those familiar with Falk’s writings over the past four decades, advocating world federalism, might find
these familiar arguments repetitive;
what is unique here is Falk’s lack of
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stridency and the absence of the nearutopian rhetoric that marks his earlier,
longer works.
Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution
scholar and founding coeditor of the
Journal of Democracy, stakes out the activist end of the other axis. He insists
that building a world of liberal democracies, whether by unilateral or multilateral means, should be the primary
objective of U.S. grand strategy. Not
only does Diamond subscribe to the
“democratic peace” theory (that real
democracies do not fight each other),
but he also argues that democratic institutions function as “elixirs” to all socioeconomic ills. Unlike Falk, Diamond
finds the solution for abusive power
and brutality through domestic democratization rather than in democratizing
international institutions—the latter a
process that (by implication) is at best
moderately helpful and potentially distracting. At worst, “one nation, one
vote” (or votes cast in international fora
by rulers of people who are not free)
thwarts the process of true (internal)
democratization by allowing authoritarian states to subvert the evolving
global trend toward greater individual
freedom. Diamond identifies the Muslim world, rogue states, and China as
having cultural “dilemmas” that resist
much direct U.S. support for democratic change, but he maintains that
they should remain the particular focus
of U.S. efforts.
Sebastian Edwards, UCLA business professor, presents a scholarly defense of
the beneficial aspects of economic globalization and concludes that the United
States must be the driver of free trade
and economic openness throughout
the global system. Pointing to the evidence between openness and income
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distribution, Edwards sees an international economic policy supportive of
globalization as a core aspect of U.S.
grand strategy. For Edwards, free capital is as important as free institutions.
Walter McDougall, Pulitzer Prize–
winning author and professor at the
University of Pennsylvania, simultaneously anchors both the unilateral and
noninterventionist ends of the twin
axes by arguing for “contra globalization and U.S. hegemony.” His is not a
unilateralism of action but a conservation of American strength for vital interests, of which strenuous efforts to
establish international institutions is
not one. McDougall also argues against
the need for an articulate and public
American grand strategy, since “strategy is by its nature secretive, deceptive,
and counterintuitive . . . and partly
reactive” and “democracies are illequipped to formulate or execute any
long-term strategy except in time of
war or obvious peril.” In his view, the
quest for a detailed grand strategy leads
nowhere, because quite simply “the
American people don’t want one.” He
equally refutes both the “Clintonian
vision of globalization” and “the neoconservative crusade.” America must
carefully husband its international political resources (particularly military deployments), since “the world today is in
a highly unnatural state” that will inevitably lead to balance of power politics
and spheres of influence. Continually
strong U.S. economic development is
the soundest policy; since “the most
predictable and direct challenges to
U.S. security are the invasion of illegal
immigrants and drugs, and the prospect
of civil collapse in Colombia, Mexico,
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and lands in between,” strengthening
pan-American relations should be the
main focus. As for the rest of the world,
“helping to prevent wars among the big
powers is the most moral task the U.S.
can perform,” a task that does not include humanitarian crusades, promotion of free trade, or global democracy.
“I am for them, by and large,” states
McDougall, “but I know America can
live without their triumph abroad” and
should not squander vital, limited resources in their pursuit. As in his book
Promised Land, Crusader State: The
American Encounter with the World
since 1776 (Houghton Mifflin, 1997),
McDougall compares the potential outcome of America’s moral crusades
overseas with that of the ephemeral and
counterproductive results of the medieval Crusades. He concludes that Americans should “cease calling for the
conversion of all nations in this generation . . . and husband the assets they will
need when and if strategic genius becomes necessary.”
As the most recent outline of America’s
ongoing foreign policy/grand strategy
debate, Foreign Policy for America in the
Twenty-first Century successfully
bridges the gap between one-sided media op-eds and cautious scholarly
tomes. Appealing to both the interested
citizen and policy specialist alike, this
book indeed delivers on its promise to
bring together major opposing “alternative views” in a succinct, highly readable way.
SAM J. TANGREDI

Captain, U.S. Navy
Arlington, Virginia
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